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In an earlier paper I suggested that a bonus expressed as a linear
function of profit and sales can induce a socialist (or any) manager to
forgo his monopolistic powers.— Here I propose to investigate whether such
a bonus might also prompt him to change, and particularly to lower, the
quality of his product: the latter effect would be most unwelcome in
socialist countries. But because, as was shown earlier, this bonus is
equivalent to a subsidy proportional to price, this investigation can
be broadened to include the effects of such a subsidy, not restricted
to its optimal value, on the quality and also on the quantity of the
2/product.— And finally, since the subsidy can be less than unity, it can
be interpreted as a proportional tax as well. It will be shown that this
subsidy (or tax) can indeed affect both quality and quantity (and of course
the price) of output, and sometimes in a rather unexpected manner.
LIST OF SYMBOLS
(in order of appearance)
£ = price of output
X = quantity of output
k = index of quality of output
£ = total cost
H = profit (including the subsidy or the tax) = zR - C
R = revenue (without the subsidy or the tax) = px
~2-
z_ = subsidy (if z^ > 1) , or tax (if _z < 1)
2 2
H TI tl — " "
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Similar notation is used for other derivatives.
It
E„ = elasticity of R in respect to k.
i\. X
X
Similar notation is used for other elasticities.
We assume that both the price and the cost of output are functions
of quantity and of quality:
(1) p = p(x, k), C = C(x, k),
where k is some quality index. It can stand for some easily quantifiable
characteristic, such as the strength of a material or the longevity of a
machine, or for something more elusive, like the variety of dresses or
the taste of wine. Quality is of course multidimensional, but no attempt
of dealing with the general complex case will be made here.
The firm (or the manager) will maximize
(2) H = zR - C
in respect to x and to k:
(3) H = zR - C = 0,X XX
(4) H^ = zR^ - C^ = 0.
The second order conditions are:
(5) H = zR - C < 0,XX XX XX
(^> \k = ^\k - ^kk < 0=
-3-
and
(7) 4 = (^\k - ^xk^' < <^^xx - ^xx><^\k - ^kk^
dx dk
We now want to find the signs of -r— and -r— . The differentiation ofdz dz
(3) and (4) results in the following system of equations:
(8)
(9)
H i2E + H
^
4^ = -R
XX dz xk dz X
H
dx
xk dz
dk
"^ \k dz " '\
with the determinant
(10) D =
H
XX
H
xk
«xk
\k
= H H,
,
- H
,
>
XX kk xk
by second order conditions (7)
(11)
(12)
dx
dz
dk
dz
-\\k + \«xk
-R, H + R H
,K XX X xk
Since we can readily assume that the firm operates in the region where
fix Hk
R > 0, R, > 0, while H < 0, H,, < by (5) and (6) , ^ > 0, ^ > if
H , > 0. Thus it only remains to explore the case when H < 0. A change
in the signs in (8) and (9) gives us two equations with all positive co-
efficients. We can immediately conclude that:
(12) if f > 0.dz ' ^'<0:
(13) if dz f>o^
(14) if f < 0.dz f>°.
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and by symmetry the same relations hold for -r— as a function of -—
.dz dz
dx dk
We should note that for either -^— < or -r— < the other derivative mustdz dz
be positive and large .
Propositions (12) - (14) can also be established by examining the
second order conditions. This method would give us more restricted results,
but on the whole it would hardly justify the effort and the space. It
dx
may be worth while to examine in detail just two cases, say when — < 0,
dk
or when -r- < though the results will be expressed in such unfamiliar
elasticities that, I suspect, they will add little to our understanding
of the problem.
dx
If 3^ < 0, then from (11)dz
(15) -^ < -^ .
From (15), (6) and (7)
^\k ^xk ^\k ^kk
X X IC K
From (16), (3) and (4)
/ -t
-J \ jCK. jCK. iCJv iCeC
X X K k
Introducing the elasticity of R in respect to k
(^«)
^R = -Bk^ ' f = -R^ '
X XX
and using similar definitions for the other elasticities, we can express
(17) as
-5-
X X K K
or as
(20) E^ - E^ < e!^ - e!^
,R R, C C,
X Tc X k
if 4^ < 0.
dz
Following the same procedure we can find that
(21) E^ - E^ < E^ - KfR^ R C, C
X k X
if 1^ < 0.
dz
k
While it is probable that E^ > (because an improvement in quality
X
should raise the marginal cost) » E^ > (because further quality improvements
V
should be more expensive, and Ej, < (if demand elasticity declines to the
K
X
right) , I would not venture to predict on a. priori grounds the signs of the
other elasticities and particularly of the differences between them.
dx dk
If we recollect that a H , > always yields — > 0, — > 0, and that
only a large negative H
,
(subject to the second order restrictions) can
dx dkgive us -r- < or -r— < 0, a negative effect of the subsidy either on quantity
uz — dz
or on quality seems unlikely. But since we do not know the probabilities
of each configuration it is best to leave the question open. It is possible
that a subsidy can improve the quality to such an extent as to reduce the
quantity, and vice versa (while exactly the opposite would be true of a
3/
tax). All this can happen, but I wonder if it has ever happened in reality?—
It is also possible that a subsidy may have an unexpected effect on
price. For
-6-
/oo\ dp dx.dk(22) d5 = Px d^ ^ Pk d^ •
Assuming, as usual, that P < and that £, > 0, we find that only if
-r— > 0, -y— < (one of the "less probable" cases) will -r^ be definitelydz dz - dz
negative. If -j- < 0, -r- > 0, then -r'- > 0, while in the supposedly most
dx dk
"common" case when -r— > 0, -r— > the result is uncertain.dz dz
The introduction of quality as a decision variable may also cast some
doubts on the welfare effects of our bonus scheme. No longer can we assert
(abstracting from the complex general equilibrium considerations) that the
bonus, even if set correctly, will increase social welfare by inducing the
manager to move from the usual monopolistic position, point D on the diagrams
of the earlier paper, to point A (of the same demand curve) where marginal
cost equals price. All we can now claim is that, if quality changes, the
manager will move from point D on the demand curve for products of one
quality to point A on the demand curve for products of another quality.
4/
It is plausible that social welfare will increase, but it is not certain.—
-7-
NOTES
* This paper was prompted by a question raised by one of my graduate
students in the Seminar on Economic Development at La Trobe University
in Melbourne (June-August, 1974) whether my bonus scheme (see note 1)
might not lower the quality of output. Unfortunately, I do not remember
who of the several students should be thanked for that.
I am very grateful to my colleague Professor Peter A. Diamond for his
gentle guidance through some labyrinths of welfare economics. He is not
to be held responsible, however, for any of my remaining mistakes.
I am also grateful to the National Science Foundation (Grant NSF-GS-2627)
for its financial support.
1. "On the Optimal Compensation of a Socialist Manager ", The Quarterly
Journal of Economics , LXXXVIII (February 1974), 1-18.
2. That optimal value of z_ was the one which induced the manager to
move to the point where marginal cost equaled price. Ibid
. , pp. 10, 16-17.
3. In the last few years there have appeared a number of articles on
the effects of monopolization on the quality of output, most of them dealing
with the durability of capital goods. For a bibliography see Richard W.
Parks, "The Demand and Supply of Durable Goods and Durability", The American
Economic Review
,
LXIV (March 1974), 37-55. It seems that the results of
that discussion have been rather inconclusive. See also an unpublished
paper by Michael Spence, "Product Selection, Fixed Costs and Monopolistic
Competition" (1974).
4. I have not proved yet that changes in quality will not affect the
convergence of the iterative process (the "Simple Rule") described in the
Mathematical Appendix of the earlier paper.
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